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Abstract. The text examines the status of the truth in the legal norms, trying 
to answer the questions of whether they can be a subject to a truth assessment and, 
if such assessment is possible, how a truth value can be attributed to legal norms. 
To achieve this goal, first of all, the text discusses some basic linguistic 
conceptions concerning the nature and truth of legal norms and subsequently, a 
complex approach is being proposed for attributing truth-value to legal norms. On 
the one hand, the latter’s being studied by the methods of deontic logic and theory 
of possible worlds, and on the other hand, their relation to truth is being explained 
by semantic anti-realism.
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1. Introduction 
The question of the truth of legal norms is intricate, as inherently the norms are 
a complex social phenomenon and therefore could not be studied unilaterally. Their 
primary (logical) source of validity is inclusion in the text of a normative act in the 
form of legal provisions. R. Tashev defines the normative act as “an act adopted by 
a competent state body by the legislative or executive power in compliance with a 
certain procedure, an act that contains legal norms with effect in domestic law, is 
drawn up in compliance with language rules and has a structure defined in Statutory 
Instruments Act” (Tashev, 2004: §49). Therefore, here we will focus only on this 
aspect of the nature of norms. Other contextual factors, such as social conditions 
(current ideas about the nature of justice, etc.) that participate in the process of their 
creation and justification, will remain outside the scope of our study.
There are various philosophical concepts concerning the truth of legal norms, 
but here we will focus only on the linguistic aspect, as this view of the norm's 
character will best serve us to achieve our goals, namely to seek an answer to the 
question of whether legal norms can be assessed in terms of truth and how their li-
ability to truth-value ascriptions can be established and argued for. For this purpose, 
we will consider both arguments in support of the thesis that such an assessment is 





we will use the methods of deontic logic to examine the truth of legal norms, mak-
ing some interpretations and additions.
2. Legal norms as a possible world 
The representatives of the linguistic conception about legal norms, also defined 
as expressivist, perceive legal norms as a type of linguistic formations, which ap-
pear as a result of prescriptive use of language, are ruled by the authority, and are an 
expression of its will. The majority of legal positivists can be regarded as advocates 
of this thesis – J. Bentham, J. Austin, H. Kelsen and others. This in legal positivism, 
two opposing theses can be identified – the cognitivists and the non-cognitivists.
Representatives of legal cognitivism consider legal norms as „sentences in a 
logical sense that are subject to assessment of their truth” (Bouzov, 2006: 30). Ac-
cording to the cognitivists, Tarski's theory of T-sentences could be applied to its 
establishment – „T/X is true if and only if P” (Tarski, 1992: 104), i.e. X is a subject 
to a penalty for implemented violation is true if and only if X is a subject to a pen-
alty for a violation. Here legal norms are considered to be descriptive sentences that 
reflect reality (“empirical or ideal” – Ibid.). 
The most extreme representative of the legal cognitivism is J. Kalinovski, ac-
cording to whom „any grammatical sentence potentially or actual can be a logical 
proposition and be a subject to truth assessment” (Ibid: 35).
On the other hand, the non-cognitivists accept that legal norms cannot be true 
or untrue because they do not describe the reality. They are designed to prescribe 
certain behaviors.1)
According to the representatives of this direction, the norms cannot have any 
cognitive value that can be examined as true or false. This notion of norms ex-
cludes the possibility of them being „subjects of logical dependencies” (Ibid: 35). 
This understanding comes from the logical-positivistic conception that „description 
requires direct and verifiable correspondence between what is affirmed by the sen-
tence and the objective state of affairs” (Ibid). However, although legal norms do 
not have such cognitive value, they can still be accepted as „objects of logical law” 
(Von Wright, 1957 cited in Von Wright, 1986: 291). 
Here, however, the question arises as to how a logical conclusion can be drawn 
from a legal norm, since they are neither true nor untrue – only sentences with 
verifiable truth value can function as a prerequisite or a conclusion. „However, a 
conclusion in the imperative mood can be drawn from two preconditions, one of 
which or both are also in the imperative mood” (Bouzov, 2006: 35). This can be 
transferred to the legal norms because although most of them are not formulated 
in the form of prescriptive sentences, they have mainly such a function К they 
produce certain actions. “When the law requires you to do something, say, that you 
„ought to do ф in circumstance C,” it purports to say that you ought to do ф, and 
that you ought to do it because the law says so” (Marmor, 2014: 62). 
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In this sense, such statements of the legislator not only prescribe to the subjects 
what to do or not to do in certain circumstances, but at the same time they express 
the reason that motivates the prescription – you must do it because it is prescribed 
by the law. In this sense, we can consider the legal prescriptions as an example of 
“paradigmatic speech acts” (Ibid: 77).
The non-cognitivists consider it possible for only the deontic propositions to be 
sentences in a logical sense since the subject of the deontic logic is the content of 
the norms in a particular legal system, which makes it possible for the norms to be 
a subject of veracity. For example, the provision of Art. 194, Para. 1 of the Penal 
Code states that “whoever takes another's movable property from the possession 
of another person without his consent with the intention of illegally appropriat-
ing it, shall be punished for a theft by an imprisonment of up to eight years.” This 
deontic proposition is true, because such a norm is derived from the relevant law, 
functioning in the Bulgarian legislation. “This type of norms always includes two 
elements: (a) a description of the necessary behavior and (b) a description of the 
consequences of behaving differently” (Aarnio, 1987: 78 – 79). These two elements 
in the theory of law are called hypothesis and disposition or hypothesis and sanc-
tion. In this form the following corresponding relations prevail: “(1) If someone 
owns the property of another person without his consent = a description of facts (le-
gal facts); (2) he will be convicted = an element of obligation (a deontic operator) 
and (3) imprisonment for a certain period of time = a description of a consequence 
(legal consequence)” (Aarnio, 1987: 77 – 78). All sentences that contain deontic 
operators such as must, mandatory, forbidden, etc. (such as legal prescriptions) can 
be interpreted in two ways – „prescriptive (as a formulation of a norm of behavior 
or a normative content) and descriptive (deontic propositions)” (Bouzov, 2006: 38).
However, in order to be able to evaluate the veracity of legal norms, we must 
take into account that „the prescriptive content might be true in one legal system 
and/or at a given time and place, but not another” (Marmor, 2014: 77). Therefore, 
a rule R is true by virtue of the fact that it is included in a certain legal system, 
let's call it S, at time T and in relation to a certain territory P. „Law is one of those 
domains in which saying so (by the appropriate agent under the appropriate circum-
stances) makes it so” (Marmor, 2014: 77). This means that the example given above 
could not be assessed for veracity in the context of another legal system except the 
Bulgarian one, because each individual country has its own legislation. 
The legal prescriptions have a legal validity precisely because they are included 
in a certain legal system, which gives A. Marmor a reason to define legal norms as 
part of a “prefixed context” (Ibid: 78), thus they may be a subject to veracity as-
sessment.
According to Marmor, a statement is true in a prefixed context because it is 
made precisely in that particular context. Take, for example, the very popular chil-
dren's song „Orange Song”. It says that everything is orange – the sea, the sky, the 
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mothers, the children, etc. It is clear that in the real world (an un-prefixed context 
– Ibid.), this could not be a true statement, but by virtue of the prefix in the song, 
it iun just that. We can say that the song builds a possible world in which the real 
color of all objects so familiar to us is completely different from their color in our 
real world. According to Lewis„our actual world is only one world among others. 
We call it alone actual not because it differs in 'kind from all the rest but because 
it is the world we inhabit” (Lewis, 1973: 85). In a similar way, we can assume that 
the legal system builds an ideal reality - the world of what should be, the world of 
the law in force. Thus postulated, this possible world presents to us an ideal reality 
in which the rights and the obligations are strictly observed and the prohibitions 
are not violated. But even if there is a legal dispute, its proper resolution should 
restore the public relations to their proper state from the point of view of the law. 
In this sense, the legal norms can be assessed for veracity, because they belong to 
this prefix and by virtue of this, the content expressed by them is always realized 
as true in the prefix (the possible world). Here it is important to note that according 
to Marmor, the prefixed context can be “closed or open” (Ibid: 80). The law is a 
closed prefix, because the statements it expresses are true by virtue of the fact that 
they are contained in this context (world). A legal prefix, in other words, „is closed 
because it ties the truth-values of statements prefixed by it to the world designated 
by the prefix itself” (Ibid: 81).
Let us now return again to the provision of Art. 194, Para. 1 and to illustrate this 
thesis by considering the process of application of the legal norms, which is a legal 
syllogism. In this process, the norms play the role of the prefixed context, from 
which all legal conclusions are drawn. 
(1) Whoever commits a theft shall be punished by an imprisonment of up to 8 years;
(2) X committed a theft.
(3) X should be sentenced by an imprisonment of to up to 8 years. 
In order to be able to deduce (3) as a conclusion from the logical interaction 
between (1) and (2), we must first assume that the legal norm (1) is part of a pre-
defined context, which introduces the rule that the theft is punishable by an impris-
onment of up to 8 years. Thus, if we take into account this prefixed context, we can 
say that (3) X should be punished for a theft is the logical consequence of (1) and 
(2). In this sense, „the inference is valid only if the truth of its premises guarantees 
the truth of its conclusion” (Ibid: 61). Therefore, in order to be able to conclude (3), 
we must consider the whole premise (1) – (3) as included in the prefixed context, 
which will in fact lead to a valid conclusion. It will be valid only if „the minor 
premise is understood as prefixed by the operator” (Ibid: 81) – according to the law 
S during the time T, etc. In this way we can accept the legal norm as always truly 
realized in the prefixed context, as its veracity cannot be tied to its realization in the 
un-prefixed context. „the truth-value of an imperative cannot depend on compli-
ance with it” (Ibid: 65).
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3. Truth in legal norms in a real world
All this, however, leads us to another important question for our study: whether 
and how the norms thus realized as true in the closed prefixed content of the legal 
system can be assessed according to the truth in the un-prefixed context (our real 
world)? Probably the answer to this question can be found in the legal realization of 
legal norms in the un-prefixed context or the real, concrete public relations, which 
are subject of legal regulation. In this process, the legal norm is a kind of measure 
that „turns the existing to itself in order to prescribe characteristics and bring it in 
the line with itself. With its function as a criterion, it concludes whether the regu-
lated factual has adopted the prescribed characteristics and whether the measure 
has become an existing” (Mihailova, 1996: 42).
Let us try to explain this by going back to the legal example given above. As 
we have already shown, this provision is true by virtue of the fact that it is part of 
the current legislation, i.e. from the prefixed context. If X commits a theft, then he 
should receive the appropriate defined statutory penalty, which is also considered 
true in the prefixed context. So in this case, if in the eyes of the law X is defined as 
the person who committed the crime, this is true in the prefixed context, regardless 
of whether the norm is actually implemented in the un-prefixed one. The conclu-
sion here is that legal norms can be assessed in for truth in the un-prefixed context, 
when what is prescribed by the relevant norm is realized in the actual reality. But 
what would happen to the truth of the norm if X was not sanctioned for the crime 
committed? In this case the norm will not be observed and therefore it will be un-
true, but only in this particular un-prefixed context, because in the prefixed context, 
the norm will always be true. When such a case arises, it is the court that can assess 
the truth in question and, depending on the outcome of the case, it may impose the 
compliance with the norm.
If, for example, a situation arises in the civil law in which the provisions of the 
legal norm are not complied with, either party could bring an action before the 
court, and „can contest the stipulation of the minor premise here, arguing that what 
he did does not count as violating the law” (Marmor, 2014: 84). However, if in the 
civil law the outcome of such a case could be decided at the discretion of the court2, 
then in criminal law, the subject of which is the case under consideration, such an 
assessment by the court is required for almost every individual case. This is due to 
the fact that although in the general case the prosecutor is competent to bring an ac-
cusation and submit it before the relevant court, the court is the body that „regularly 
seized with an indictment, initiates court proceedings, hears and decides the case” 
(Manev, 2006: 359), making a comparison between the true legal norms in the 
prefixed context and the real facts and events (un-prefixed context), i.e. the panel 
of judges makes a logical judgment (example (1 – 3) above) in which the meaning 
could serve as the necessary explanatory method, because it is precisely this that 
makes the connection between the components of the world and the components 
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of language. As we have already shown, considered as a purely linguistic expres-
sion, the hypothesis of the legal norm is a predicate incorporating many referential 
relations, which refer to many potential addressees and realizations of factual cir-
cumstances.3) “The „signification” relationship should show how something that is 
linguistic is at the same time something outside of the language” (Karageorgieva, 
2006: 128), how the linguistically expressed third person is at the same time X who 
has committed a theft. “Here it is important “the role of the linguistic expression, 
and in particular of the logical/grammatical subject, to refer, i.e. to select or specify 
a separate object” (Ibid.). If the court manages to recognize X as a referent of the 
norm, i.e. as the person who committed the theft due to which he was brought to 
justice, the legal case would be resolved successfully, but also the legal norm itself 
would be realized as true in the real world (un-prefixed context). So, in this case 
„we must rely on judges to grapple with the uncertain fit between the law, language 
and the world” (Hutton, 2009: 153).
The main precondition for the initiation of any criminal proceedings for crimes 
of a general nature (such as the example we are considering) is the indictment, the 
structure and the details of which are normatively defined in the Criminal Procedure 
Code. Each indictment is a descriptive content which aims to present to the court 
the facts and the circumstances relating to the already committed criminal act as an 
objective fact in the past, and accordingly it aims to attribute to the accused person 
certain universal properties, because “the attribution of properties by composing 
subject-predicate linguistic expressions makes a significant contribution to our ori-
entation. It categorizes or classifies the objects, sorts them into certain groups as 
having this or that property and showing this or that “behavior” (Karageorgieva, 
2006: 129). In this way, the main task before the court is formed – to establish the 
objective truth of this deception in the specific case, i.e. whether X corresponds to 
his categorization as the person who committed the theft. „Only if „the object fits 
the category under which it is misled, we can speak of truth, because the expres-
sion that performs this misrepresentation is true” (Ibid.). This raises the question 
of establishing the objective truth as a central one to the example considered here. 
In confirmation of this we can refer to Art. 13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 
which states that both the court and the prosecutor and the investigative bodies are 
obliged to take all measures to reveal the objective truth in the manner and by the 
means provided for in this code. Formulated in this way, the provision in question 
shows not only the central place that truth occupies in the criminal process, but also 
shows that the means for its comprehensive and objective establishment are regu-
lated by the law. This applies to both the pre-trial and trial phase of the proceedings 
themselves. However, when we speak here for searching of the objective truth, it 
must be understood in the sense of logical monism, which assumes that „the truth 
is one (In Sivilov, 1992(1): 19), a thesis that is closely related to the ontological 
monism – “the doctrine that reality is one” (Ibid.). In this sense, at the ontological 
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level, these are the specific facts relating to the commission of the specific crime 
– when, what, in what way and in what factual situation the crime took place. “It 
manifests itself as it is – an objective fact with a certain characteristic left in the 
past” (Manev, 2006: 69).
However, we must take into account the fundamental principle expressed by 
B. Russell that „every proposition we can conceive of must be composed entirely 
of constituents we know directly” Russell, 1999: 48). But here the question arises, 
how can the judiciary, on the basis of this indictment, drawn up in a descriptive 
form, assess the veracity of all the legal norms applicable to the case without having 
such a perceptual access? Such an assessment potentially poses a number of dif-
ficulties: in the first place, the members of the judiciary, including the prosecutor, 
should not have any prior perceptual access to the facts of the case, i.e. they should 
not have been present at the events in question (they should not have witnessed the 
act) – if such circumstances exist, they should have recused themselves in the case. 
However, how then, could the objective truth be established in the absence 
of Russell's much-needed perceptual approach? According to him, we can have 
knowledge only of truths that constitute our own experience, which, in turn, is 
made up of all the terms to which we have had direct access. And although Russell 
believes that we are able to assimilate knowledge of terms through knowledge by 
description, he believes that this, while useful, still makes the knowledge thus ac-
quired “mysterious and therefore uncertain” (Russell, 1999: 49). Therefore, when 
looking for the objective truth relating to a certain fact of the past, we must keep in 
mind that the conclusions made by the knowing subject can be true or false, i.e. “to 
correspond or not to correspond to the objective manifestation of the crime in the 
reality” (Manev, 2006: 69). This is because, as Russell puts it, “the truth or falsity 
of the statement does not depend on the person who judges it, but only on the facts 
he judges” (Russell, 1992: 10), i.e. the meaning of a sentence depends on the con-
ditions for its truth, because it is established through the conclusions that a person 
makes when there are some prerequisites that ensure that the sentence is defined 
either true or false – the so-called principle of bivalence.
But it is the fact that this truth must be sought in past events that makes this 
process vulnerable to errors, as the realists accept that a large number of statements, 
including those related to the past, “have transcendent verification conditions of a 
truth” (Mollov, 2014: 354), which means that we could not establish with certainty 
their truth value.
If we accept the realistic thesis as indisputable, then we would conclude that it 
would be impossible for the court to decide any court case. However, as we know, 
this is not the case in practice. The judicial panels are constantly dealing with a va-
riety of cases, some of which are extremely complex and intricate. This is necessary 
because denial of justice is unacceptable and even impossible. In addition, in the 
course of each criminal proceeding there is a complex transition from„ontological 
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to epistemological level and from epistemological to psychological level of cogni-
tive activity” (Manev, 2006: 69).
At the ontological level, as a fact from the past, the criminal act, as we have 
already shown in the text above, allows to build a logical chain on the basis of 
which to draw conclusions and ultimately the case to be resolved successfully. “At 
the epistemological level, the knowing subject forms conclusions about the fac-
tual circumstances of the crime” (Ibid.), i.e. about the objective reality. As for the 
psychological level, it is related to the inner convictions of the court, which relate 
to the truth or falsity (the authenticity) of the knowledge acquired. This makes it 
possible for the court to assess the circumstances surrounding the resolution of the 
case and subsequently to issue a procedural act.
All this gives us reason to ask ourselves how is it possible to carry out this 
complex logical-cognitive process, provided that the judiciary, as we have already 
stated, should not have any direct perceptual access? Here we will offer a possible 
explanation, through the anti-realist alternative proposed by M. Dummett. In the 
literature we have studied, we have not encountered such an application of his 
theory for the analysis of the truth of legal norms, so we can consider this approach 
as a contribution in this area.
Dummett “rejects the principle of the bivalence” (Dummett, 1996: 462 – 478), 
because he believes that “a statement is true or false not by virtue of some condi-
tions on which its truth value depends, but because of “conditions under which we 
are able to affirm it as true” (Ibid.). That is why, according to Dummett, the explan-
atory method of the realism faces two challenges – “the challenge of assimilation 
and the challenge of manifestation” (Dummett, 1978). 
The challenge of learning requires realism to explain how the speakers of one 
language are able to learn, understand and use that language in its entirety. Such an 
explanation should clarify how people who speak a particular language understand 
the meaning of the sentences in particular field, which allows them to assess their 
truth, even though those sentences have truth conditions that transcend verification. 
But if it is possible to assimilate the knowledge of sentences of given area, then 
they do not have transcendent conditions. The challenge of manifestation, accord-
ing to Dummett, formulates some of the most important gaps in the explanatory 
method of realism about the way in which our knowledge of the meaning of the 
sentences in a particular field manifests itself in our speech. When we understand 
the meaning of a sentence in principle, this knowledge is acquired through commu-
nication within the language community (this means, not only that the experiential 
basis of knowledge must consist in our experience, not in my experience, but that 
experience can be characterized only as the experience of a common world inhab-
ited by others as well as me (Dummett, 1996: 471). Therefore, if we assume that 
we understand a particular language, the concept of "a truth" will contain all the 
explanatory knowledge we need to validate an utterance “(A is true) as equivalent 
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to the statement that (A is true – Ibid.1). However, according to Dummett, “this 
knowledge is in no way manifested in our linguistic abilities, which leads to the 
conclusion that we do not have knowledge of the truth conditions of the sentences 
relating to the corresponding field” (Ibid.). This gives Dummett a reason to look 
for an alternative method that would make it possible to successfully identify a 
sentence as true or false. 
Dummett considers the intuitionistic approach to be the most acceptable, which 
explains the meanings of mathematical propositions, i.e. knowing that a statement 
A is true means having a proof of it. The meaning of a sentence depends on the 
way we use the sentence in question, and this ability is manifested in our linguistic 
practice, because when we use it, it means that we have knowledge of its meaning. 
In this sense, once we are able to use this sentence correctly, it means that we have 
grasped its meaning. When we look for the truth value of a sentence, it will depend 
not on any conditions that transcend verification, but on our ability to apply both 
our knowledge of the sentence itself and the conditions that contribute to its iden-
tification as true or false. This indicates the main weakness in Dummett's theory, 
namely the semanticization of truth.4) Our goal here, however, is not to point out 
shortcomings in his theory, but rather to check its applicability in the law enforce-
ment process.
Such an intuitionistic approach (as that of Dummett) in resolving a legal case 
can be attributed to the court panel, as any decision relating to the establish-
ment of the objective truth is directly related to “the formation of a certain infer-
ence, conclusion, or idea in the procedural body – the so-called subjective party” 
(Manev, 2006: 82). This inner conviction is formed on the basis of a set of dif-
ferent factors – the so-called „objective criteria for correctness” (Ibid.), on which 
depend the correct perception and understanding of the objective factual circum-
stances, the truth value of which must be confirmed. It is the fact that the court 
panel is able to establish this truth through objective knowledge of the evidences, 
shows that there is an opportunity both to learn the meaning of all evidences and 
to understand their truth conditions. This leads us to Dummett's point of view that 
our ability to understand a proposition consists “not in discovering, but in recog-
nizing the evidences” for its validity. This means that such a proposal has condi-
tions that assign it to the group of effectively solvable proposals. This means that 
such a proposition has conditions that assign it to the group of effectively solv-
able propositions. “A sentence is said to be effectively solvable in the presence of 
a generally applicable procedure to ensure that that sentence is defined as true or 
false” (Mollov, 2014: 360). If we go back to the example (2) X committed a theft, 
the truth value of this proposition can be confirmed after the court has objectively 
examined all the evidences and on the basis of their testimony it forms its inner 
conviction (here the court appliesanintuitionisticapproach), to draw the appropri-
ate logical conclusions which lead to the resolution of the criminal proceedings. 
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That's why Dummett believes that the intuitionism is the most appropriate means 
of attributing truth value, as it will enable us to use the proof as a fulcrum – our 
ability to recognize what establishes the truth, and thus the truth or the untruth 
will be based on verification conditions.
But when we are faced with a proposition whose truth we cannot establish, it does 
not mean, according to Dummett, that it has conditions that transcend the verification 
of a truth. In order to be able to successfully solve such a proposition, the British phi-
losopher believes, we must accept our knowledge of the truth as “epistemically lim-
ited”, i.e. in order to reach the truth, it is necessary to consider it „in terms of a correct 
or reasonable validity” (Mollov, 2014: 361). In other words, accepting a proposition 
as true means that there are grounds for its affirmation or some other property of it, 
“constructed by a reasonable validity” (Mollov, 2014: 361). 
In the criminal proceedings, such justification of the truth conditions can be 
found in the motivation of the decision that the court makes in the final proce-
dural act, which ends the case. In this phase of the criminal proceedings, the court 
substantiates in writing its decisions, referring to the evidences (conditions) that 
underlie the internal conviction thus formed. In addition, the purpose of the reasons 
goes in two directions: „The possibility of the control procedural bodies to check 
the validity and the legality of the procedural act, the soundness and the correctness 
of the conclusions made in the act; self-control. When setting out in writing the 
reasons for the procedural act, the deciding body reconsiders the qualities of the ac-
quired knowledge, the conclusions imposed by the set of evidences available in the 
case, the legal arguments of its position on the legal qualification and determination 
of punishment, etc.” (Manev, 2006: 85).
4. Conclusion 
In any judicial proceeding, regardless of the procedural act by which the case is 
terminated, the panel of judges should explicitly indicate the specific legal provi-
sions that are applied in it. In this way, the truth of the respective legal norms from 
the prefixed context (the world of the due) is transferred to the un-prefixed one (the 
real social relations) through their realization. However, accepting this method of 
establishing the truth, here we are faced with the possibility that it leads to errone-
ous conclusions, as they are based mainly on the judgment that the subject makes 
about the facts of reality, i.e. there is a connection between actual facts and “human 
cognitive resources” (Mollov, 2014: 364). Therefore, such an approach may lead to 
incorrect validation of a proposal. Therefore, in order to avoid such undesirable end 
results in court proceedings, the legislator has provided various ways to re-examine 
the sentence passed by the court of first instance, such as the re-examination of the 
case by a duly seised and court of Appeal.
Assuming the thesis that the legal system builds an ideal world (a prefixed con-
text) in which the content expressed by the legal norms is always true, we have 
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shown a possible way in which truth value can be attributed in the un-prefixed 
context also. In the course of the analysis we showed that this assessment could be 
achieved in law enforcement process, where the world of the factual (actual) meets 
that of the due or becomes expressed in the legal norms, transforming it according 
to their prescriptions. Therefore, in this way a sign of equality between factual and 
due can be placed, and the legal norm can be assessed and confirmed as truly real-
ized in both worlds.
However, the question of the similarities and differences between the verifica-
tionist approach we adhere to and the coherent and pragmatic views on the theory 
of truth is beyond the scope of our study, so it has not been discussed here.
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NOTES
1. Legal norms do not tell us how things are in the world. They indicate what we can 
and can not do and therefore what the penalties for violating their prescriptions.
2. Although this is necessary rather exceptionally because, most of the legal 
relations are performed voluntarily - the so-called indisputable realization.
3. Legal norms are equally valid for X, Y and Z.
4. In modern epistemology, there are many attempts to view truth as independent 
of questions of meaning. For example, by applying neuroscientific data showing 
that truth is not a concept but a logical operator – J. Prince, Quine, Horwich and 
others.
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